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ÖZ 
 
GÖÇMEN KARŞITI TUTUM VE EMEK PREKARİTESİNİN GÖÇMENLERE ÇİFTE MALİYETİ: 
ALMANYA, FRANSA VE İNGİLTERE VAKALARI 
 
Kına, Mehmet Fuat 
Sosyoloji Bölümü Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Zübeyir Nişancı 
 
Bu çalışma, Avrupa Değerler Araştırması’nın sonuncu ve dördüncü dalgasından 
istifade ederek, bireysel değişkenlere bakarak, her bir ülke için ayrı ayrı kurulan ve en 
küçük kareler yöntemine (EKK) dayanan nicel modellerle, Almanya, İngiltere ve 
Fransa’da çalışan kesimin göçmen karşıtı tutumunu (bağımsız değişken) analiz 
etmektedir. Ampirik analize teorik bir derinlik kazandırmak amacıyla, göçmen karşıtı 
tutum, öznel iş güvencesizliği ve emek prekaritesi literatürlerinden faydalanır. Ayrıca, 
post-modern dönemde güvensizlik ve bir sınıf olarak “prekarya” meselelerini tartışır. 
Bulgular, göçmen karşıtlığını belirlemede öznel iş güvencesizliğinin bu üç ülke için de 
en önemli faktörlerden biri olduğunu göstermektedir. Sonuçlarla delillendirilen ana 
argüman, emek prekaritesinin göçmenler üzerinde ikili bir maliyet yarattığı fikrine 
dayanmaktadır. Bu onların hem daha güvencesiz çalışmalarından, hem de yerlilerin 
güvencesizliğinin sorumlusu olarak görülmelerinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Esnek emek 
piyasası, yerlilerin olumsuz tutumları yoluyla göçmenleri daha da güvensiz bir hale 
itmektedir. Çalışma ayrıca ülkelerin sahip oldukları emek piyasası politikaları, 
milliyetçilik biçimleri ve politik kültürlerindeki çeşitlilikten yola çıkarak modeller 
arasındaki farklılıkları açıklamaya dair bir tartışma yürütür. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: göçmen karşıtı tutum, çifte maliyet, güvensizlik, prekarite, emek, esneklik  
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ABSTRACT 
 
ANTI-IMMIGRANT ATTITUDES AND THE DUAL COST OF LABOR PRECARITY FOR 
IMMIGRANTS: THE CASES OF GERMANY, FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Kına, Mehmet Fuat 
MA in Sociology 
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Zübeyir Nişancı 
 
This study analyzes anti-immigrant attitudes of workers (as the dependent variable) 
in Germany, France and the United Kingdom through separate OLS models with 
individual variables in each country and finalize a multi-linear analysis by using the 
fourth and last wave of European Value Survey. In order to construct a theoretical 
depth for the empirical analysis, it utilizes three separate literatures on anti-
immigrant attitudes, subjective job insecurity and labor precarity. Discussions on 
post-modern insecurity and the precariat as a class are also included. Findings reveal 
that subjective job insecurity in all three countries is one of the most remarkable 
predictors of negative attitudes towards immigrants. The main argument, as proven 
by the results is that, there is a dual cost of labor precarity for immigrants since they 
are also scapegoated as the cause of insecurity, in addition to be suffering from their 
own precariousness. Flexible labor-markets put immigrants in a more unsecured 
position in the society by way of the attitudes of native workers. The research also 
points out differences of the countries on matters of political culture, nationhood and 
labor-market policy while explaining differences among models. 
 
Keywords: anti-immigrant attitudes, dual cost, insecurity, precarity, labor, flexibility 
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1. Introduction 
Attitudes towards immigrants have remained on the agenda of academic world over 
the past several decades as the number of migrants has risen all around the world. 
The increasing mobility of people due to growing transnational networks, advances 
in transportation technology, economic and democratic interregional global 
inequalities, and instability caused by civil wars in the Middle East (especially in Iraq 
and Syria) have made immigrants more visible in Western societies. The rise of anti-
immigrant attitudes is another side of the same coin. The number of anti-immigrant 
crimes in Germany, for example, doubled from 2011 to 2015 (Kempf, 2016). Scholars 
have discussed the rise of anti-immigrant violence mostly from the perspective of the 
rise of anti-immigrant right-wing political parties in Europe (Boomgaarden & 
Vliegenthart, 2007; Rydgren, 2008; Mudde, 2013; Hockenos, 2013).  
The reflection of anti-immigrant attitudes in (electoral) politics is also noticeable. 
Right-wing leader Donald Trump, in one of his public speeches before the 2014 
elections, called on his voters to be careful about immigrants: “They are taking our 
jobs. You better be careful! You better be careful!”1 Before the French election in 
2017, Marine Le Pen promised that he would protect the French from immigrants: 
“Your neighbors, your village, your children’s school, your life, your wages will be 
inevitably impacted by immigration. I, as president, will put back our borders in place 
the next day in office!”2 The rise of the Alternative for Germany Party (AfD) and the 
success of Theresa May in the United Kingdom are other examples of similar trends 
in Europe.   
Independently of the discussions on the rise of rightism, academics still have not 
adequately explored specific-structural effects of the culture of new capitalism 
(Sennett, 2007) on the attitudes of natives. Although efforts in the social sciences to 
understand the fundamental predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes (AIA) have a long 
history (Blumer, 1958; Neol & Pinkney, 1964; Blalock, 1967), there is not a dominant 
theory in the literature (Price and Oshagan, 1995; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; 
Rustenbach, 2010). Stable yet fragmented efforts of academics, and socio-economic 
                                                          
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C9kHJ6cRzdE in 25.10.2017 
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6IHqxsE_pU in 3.11.2017 
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aspects of migration imply that the emphasis on migrant studies (and specifically for 
studies on AIA) does not only stem from recent rise of rightism in Europe. Migrant 
studies are also very important to understand the social solidarity, that is evidently 
under the pressure of labor-market.  
As the rhetoric of right-wing political leaders suggests, anti-immigrant attitudes seem 
to have some form of an association with fear of job loss. Nevertheless, the individual 
fear of natives (in the US and in Europe) for the loss of their jobs has not been 
sociologically investigated before as the main trigger of negative attitudes and 
behaviors against immigrants despite unemployment rates at regional and national 
level have been mostly covered (Hjerm, 2009; Schneider, 2008). Unemployment rate 
is a structural variable which could not help scholars to see the variation of feelings 
of security individuals are having. It is possible to do research on the negative attitude 
of natives towards immigrants in many ways. However, such efforts would be 
misleading without building a sociological perspective focusing on the pressure of 
today’s work life on individuals. 
For every social group, work life experienced a transformation in 1980s (Harvey, 
2005). The labor side of the transformation of “work” has a rooted relationship with 
immigrants. It is widely accepted that during the last 30-40 years, labor-market has 
started to be reformed with much more flexibility resulting in higher risks of 
unemployment for individual workers than the previous welfare period. This has 
been perceived as the counter attack of capitalist classes against vested rights of 
working classes in the welfare period (Sennett, 2007). For both migrant and native 
laborers, neoliberal labor-market flexibility means job insecurity. However, precarity, 
as a social and economic condition of the individuals who suffer from individual socio-
economic instability, has systematically increased in the case of immigrants 
(Standing, 2011). Regarding the precarity as not just an economic deprivation, but 
more likely, the deprivation of security, even of stable social network or legal rights, 
the migration itself gives rise to precariousness (Goldring & Joly, 2014). Although in 
the last few decades labor researchers have engaged with the precarity of 
marginalized and mostly oppressed groups, immigrants are still not sufficiently 
analyzed in the academic discourse.  
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Scholars mostly take job security in a subjective manner when they conceptualize it 
as “perceived job security” and describe it as “a psychological state in which workers 
vary in their expectations of future job continuity within an organization” (Kraimer, 
Wayne, Liden, & Sparrowe, 2005, p. 390). It is often considered as the self-perceived 
probability of job loss (Mohr, 2000). In this research, I take job security as the 
particular responses  of native working classes in the concept of workers’ individual 
fears towards the loss of jobs in the country (in other words, fears of job loss at a 
national level) and use the term “subjective job insecurity” (SJI) because of 
methodological concerns. 
Concentrating on empirical and theoretical relationships between the widening SJI of 
native working classes and their attitudes toward immigrants, I will explore the 
determinants of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes (AIA) in Europe. What are the 
determinants of AIA? How are they affected by individual SJI? What might be the 
social roots behind the AIA of European native workers’ in today’s work life? How can 
one understand the social exclusion of immigrants? What is the cost of neoliberal 
flexibility for immigrants? Through an individual-level analysis (by Ordinary Least 
Square / OLS regression) for three countries (Germany, the United Kingdom and 
France), this paper aims to create a bridge between migrant studies and critical labor 
discussions. These are the first three countries at harboring the biggest numbers of 
immigrants in Europe. While analyzing AIA, in order to be able to deepen my analysis 
regarding differentiation of labor-market policies and difference of nationhood, I 
apply separate models for each country. On the one hand, focusing on individual level 
variables helps to analyze the relationship between individual precarity (related to 
the macro level transformations) and the attitudes towards immigrants. On the other 
hand, examining country specific regressions would help us to see and reveal 
specificities of each country and compare them. In this sense, both of the contextual 
and individual factors are methodologically considered. I used the last wave of the 
European Value Survey (2008-2010), by modeling a large-scale index for the 
dependent variable (AIA). 
With the contribution of empirical evidence, this research investigates if and how the 
precariousness of neoliberal working conditions affect AIA among native workers.  
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The debate over the attitudes of native workers against deprived newcomers, who 
are either more precarious or blamed for the wealth loss, constitutes the main focus. 
They are precarious since being more vulnerable and they are “guilty” since taking 
native jobs. I suggest a new concept to understand the costs of atypical employment 
forms over immigrants: the “dual cost”. This dual cost arises from the combination of 
a direct cost (economic vulnerability due to their labor-market position) and an 
indirect (social) cost of labor flexibility, instituting a hostility for immigrants. More 
hostility (or more negative attitudes) also gives some clues on labor solidarity among 
natives and immigrants. This study assumes solidarity is more than the participation 
of workers in formal-manifested cooperation mechanisms like trade unions. It hence 
suggests taking labor solidarity as in the contexture of social solidarity, which is vital 
for the case of immigrants. 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework  
The literature focusing on the core issues of this study can be explored in three 
separate but related areas: AIA, SJI, and the precarity of labor. While discussions on 
AIA concentrate on the main predictors of negative attitudes toward immigrants, SJI 
literature often tends to focus on the consequences of workers’ SJI. Labor precarity 
is mostly associated with the transformation of labor in today’s work life in the sense 
of growing risk, insecurity and flexibility, rather than decreasing solidarity of workers. 
In this chapter, I will elaborate on two theoretical debates by deepening in precarity 
discussions, contributed to by Richard Sennett and Guy Standing, related to the 
overall characteristics of flexible times; they are respectively “age of insecurity” and 
“precariat, as a class”. The theoretical significance of immigrants and anti-immigrant 
attitudes in the light of these fields, and the hypothesis and assumptions of this study 
are given at the end of this chapter. 
A. Anti-immigrant Attitude (AIA)  
In migrant studies, there is a growing literature on the attitudes of natives (Anderson, 
2010; Gorodzeisky, 2011; Hainmueller, Hiscox & Margalit, 2015; Berg, 2015; 
Nagayoshi & Hjerm, 2015). While some texts focus on social-psychological or political 
factors, others emphasize rational-choice-related economic factors such as job 
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scarcity, competition, and fear of possible welfare loss (Markaki & Longhi, 2012). The 
fundamental question I focus on in the AIA literature is what determines negative 
attitudes. The explanations of AIA are many. Rustenbach (2010) sorts eight 
prominent explanations (cultural marginality theory, human capital theory, political 
afﬁliation, societal integration, neighborhood safety, contact theory, foreign 
investment, and economic competition) and exemplifies all in one analysis with 
fitting specific predictors for each. She finds no significant correlation for cultural 
marginality and contact explanations, but strong effects for -from strongest to 
weakest- interpersonal trust (societal integration), educational level (human capital 
theory), left versus right political leaning (political affinity), income per capita 
(economic competition). Berg (2015) divides the theories in the previous literature 
into five categories: “personal social identity, self and group interest, cultural values 
and beliefs, social interaction and multilevel theories”. He favors multilevel theories 
and intersectional approaches addressing class, race and gender because these 
theories are more convenient to understand the fluid boundaries of racial identities 
in ethnically more diverse societies of today. 
Pettigrew (1998) reformulated the intergroup contact theory of Allport (1954) in a 
more dynamic pattern by taking into consideration both social norms and individual 
differences and including different stages of contact. The scope of the contact theory 
is historically not limited just in the case of immigrants. Rather it is first discussed 
through overall prejudice and perceived threat of individuals in a psychosocial 
manner. Some other scholars then criticized the lack of individual-level variables in 
the literature and applied the problematic of contact - whether it is a theory or not - 
to the issue of AIA at an individual level (McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995). It basically 
assumed that the level of racial prejudice is mostly determined by the degree of 
interaction between native and immigrant individuals or groups. Accordingly, natives, 
who come into contact with more immigrants in everyday life (e.g. at school or work, 
or as neighbors) tend to have more positive view of them. They found psychological 
conditions, like negative correlation between perceived threat and feeling of 
familiarity, as the most significant determinants, mainly in comparison to economic 
hardship and competition.  
6 
 
Political views are also linked to the formation of attitudes towards minority groups 
(Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Cosmopolitanism, holding more liberal 
values, rejecting ethnocentrism, and being less nationalist are associated with pro-
immigrant sentiments (Haubert & Fussell, 2006; O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). Factors 
effecting pro-immigrant sentiments may not be effective for anti-immigrant 
sentiments (Wilkes, Guppy & Farris, 2008). Effective predictors of pro and anti-
immigrant sentiments are not always the same. Wilkes, Guppy and Farris found that 
only “ideology” was effective for both. 
Increasing educational levels among workers also consistently predict lower levels of 
prejudice and higher levels of openness toward immigrants regardless of workers’ 
skill levels. Low skilled native workers are more likely to be inhospitable towards the 
immigrants because they view them as sources of competition (Scheve & Slaughter, 
2001). The positive effect of education appears to stem from predictable capacity for 
empathy of well-educated natives. Being more educated might foster more tolerance 
for “others” (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). However, scholars who use labor-market 
competition arguments to explain anti-immigrant attitudes present another reason 
for the positive effect of education. They argue that immigrants are more likely to 
complement rather than replace natives with higher educational levels since 
immigrants mainly compete for low skilled jobs (Markaki & Longhi, 2012; Hainmueller 
& Hiscox, 2010).  
Another assumption of competition theory was that every skill group would have a 
negative approach to the immigration of potential competitors of the same skill level. 
Yet, empirical analyses have shown that immigrants with high skill levels are 
perceived as more acceptable by all natives regardless of skill level (Hainmueller & 
Hiscox, 2010). High-skilled natives, however, are less opposed to immigration in 
comparison to the low skilled (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Considering the 
significance of relative skill of natives to immigrants, which is positively correlated 
with openness to immigration, Mayda (2006) found empirical evidence for greater 
significance of economic factors in comparison to noneconomic ones.  
Economic competition is usually calculated by GDP, unemployment rate, income, or 
skill or occupational level (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001: Hainmueller, Hiscox & Margalit, 
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2015). Some divide the unemployment rate effect of natives and immigrants with 
upper-level analyses and reach the conclusion that independently of the 
unemployment rate of natives at a regional level, more unemployed immigrants 
increase feelings of threat from immigrants (Markaki & Longhi, 2012). The 
fundamental argument of labor-market-competition theory is similar to one of the 
implications of this research: natives are looking for someone to blame in times of 
recession (Hempstead & Espenshade, 1996). Group-conflict theory also considers the 
competition between immigrants and natives for scarce material resources. In line 
with the implications of this theory, scholars have recently found that socio-economic 
insecurity significantly effects on perceived ethnic threat (Billiet, Meuleman & de 
Witte, 2014). They also found significant effect of job insecurity. 
In a more recent study, Nagayoshi and Hjerm (2015) found promising evidence for 
the effects of labor-market policies across different welfare regimes as they 
endeavored to discuss the significant implications for anti-immigration to develop an 
institutional framework. The study highlights active labor-market policies - “which 
complement job losses through improving the employability of the unemployed” 
(2015, p. 2) - associates with lower levels of negative attitudes. In doing so, the 
authors also pointed out that institutions matter, especially for the most vulnerable.  
Gender is often found to be statistically insignificant, albeit a weaker, predictor of 
AIA. When it is found to be significant, the AIA among women tends to be stronger 
than men (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Gorodzeisky, 2011). Age, like gender, mostly 
does not yield a significant impact, controlling for other factors. However, when age 
holds a significant effect, it is always negative. Older people have more negative 
attitudes towards newcomers (Hempstead & Espenshade, 1996). 
Although a limited number of studies have found that both socio-economic factors 
and political preferences matter (Hempstead & Espenshade, 1996; Mayda, 2006; 
Wilkes, Guppy & Farris, 2008), there are some gaps in these studies. Literature is 
widely dominated by psychological arguments, which are often plagued by the lack 
of well-defined direction of causality. In the example of intergroup contact theory, 
people who are more positive towards immigrants might be more exposed to 
connections and interactions with immigrants. It is not hard to claim that daily 
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“interpersonal trust” is influenced by anti-immigrant attitudes, which might also be 
affected by entirely different social and economic determinants. 
Even though a significant proportion of the previous research take economic aspects 
into account, socio-economical aspect of insecurity still needs to be analyzed in-
depth since it is so open to feed and to be fed by individual fears on job insecurity for 
both immigrants and native workers. In addition, these studies do not pay due 
attention to the theoretical discussion of the structural downsizing of labor and they 
rarely discuss psychological aspects and economic conditions together. This thesis 
argues that their insufficient theoretical implications in sociological concepts and 
unconcern with overall labor flexibility are misleading. The social sphere is often 
reduced to the number of contact and size of groups (Quillian, 1995; Schlueter & 
Scheepers, 2010). Operationalization has always been needed, but not by sacrificing 
theory. “Sociological imagination”, so to speak, is essential to be able to visualize 
psychological and economic aspects together. With the contribution of consideration 
of “class”, for example, one can understand and combine economic “exploitation” 
and psychological “alienation” by the social theory. In this sense, sociology should be 
invited to connect psychological and economic discussions. The connection between 
attitudes against immigrants and labor discussions would bring better-directed 
points and arguments for this sociological lack. 
B. Subjective Job Insecurity (SJI)  
One of the crucial points of negative approaches towards immigrants is the impacts 
of SJI. The rising negative consequences of non-standard employment all around the 
world brings job security in question in view of widening labor flexibility discussions 
(Valverde, Tregaskis & Brewster, 2000). Quinlan (2015), in his recent study, reviews 
studies of precariousness by focusing on the effect of non-standard employment on 
the health status' of workers. In this context, non-standard employment varies in the 
number of types of work such as temporary, subcontracted, part-time, fixed-term, 
on-call, casual, and home-based employment as well as dependent self-employment, 
and informal sector work which have become more common over the last couple of 
decades (Quinlan, 2015). 
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While the idea of flexibility was discussed in academic discourse mostly through the 
pursuit of “efficiency” during 1980s and early 1990s, in the last two to three decades 
scholars have started to focus on its negative impacts on workers’ psychological well-
being (Ferrie, Shipley, Stansfeld & Marmot, 2002; Loi, Ngo, Zhang & Lau, 2011; 
Sverke, Hellgren & Näswall, 2002). Flexible labor results in withdrawal of prediction 
regarding the future and strategic planning for workers.  
Flexibility was a functional step for the sake of efficiency, despite the stability loss. 
This means stability lost its popularity with rising attention on efficiency. One 
fundamental argument of scholars who support more flexible employment relations 
is related to the correlation between (inflexible) job security regulations and high 
unemployment (Lazear, 1990; Pagés & Heckmann, 2000). They claimed that if 
governments offered more job security provisions (like severance-pay requirements) 
that would increase hiring costs of permanent workers. Their efforts had an active 
role in increasing flexibility during 1980s. Additionally, technological advancements 
also forced firms to be more flexible so that they may compete against leading firms 
(Gustafsson, 1984).  
Scholars in 1980s began to promote principles of flexibility extensively (Buzacott, 
1982; Slack, 1983; Atkinson, 1984; Atkinson, 1987; Browne, Dubois, Rathmill, Sethi & 
Stecke, 1984; Gerwin, 1987). An early model of flexible firms described by Atkinson 
is shown in Figure 1. The focus of his description was on the division of employed 
workers in the firm with wide range of flexibilities at varying degrees.  
However, in 2000s, even in mainstream economics, scholars have started to mention 
the necessity of abstaining from the dark side of flexibility with respect to damages 
on mental health status of workers in the sense of decreasing the feeling of security 
at work. Consequently, while some of them did not give up flexibility, they proposed 
flexible but secure employment, “flexicurity” (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004), meanwhile, 
others harshly judged flexibility (Standing, 1999). 
SJI is sometimes used as a broader description of perceived job insecurity (PJI) and 
frequently as a synonym for it. Scholars have understood SJI and treated it as a 
worker’s fear of losing his/her job, and have not focused much on its broader (country 
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or regional-level) implications. Alongside showing the negative impacts of SJI on the 
psychological well-being (Ashford, Lee & Bobko 1989; De Witte 1999) and physical 
health of workers (Crandall & Perrewe, 1995; Quick & Tetrick, 2003), convincing 
evidence has also been presented to show that job insecurity decreases work 
performance and productivity of firms (Sverke, Hellgren & Näswall, 2002; Cheng & 
Chan, 2008; Erlinghagen, 2007). A high level of SJI is strongly associated with, lower 
levels of job satisfaction and work engagement in addition to high levels of job 
burnout and psychosomatic complaints. Strong empirical evidence for long-term 
causality between SJI and health problems have been recently found by scholars (De 
Witte, Pienaar & De Cuype, 2016). 
Not only SJI, but also negative outcomes of objective job insecurity (OJI), as the 
complement of SJI,  or objective threat of unemployment, which is often measured 
by the form and duration of contracts and being informed about dismissal for an 
individual worker, are discussed in the literature (De Witte & Näswall, 2003). 
Although it is widely known today that there is a strong correlation between objective 
threat of unemployment and SJI (De Cuyper, De Witte, Vander Elst & Handaja, 2009), 
the former is not found to be as harmful as the latter (Mauno, Kinnunen, Mäkikangas 
& Nätti, 2005). 
Previous studies emphasize the psychological and economic costs of SJI, and scholars 
have started to discuss the shadowy aspects of flexibility. On the one hand, they 
Source: Atkinson (1984) 
Figure 1: Structure of Flexible Firms 
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explored crucial sociological topics such as; how people from lower social classes and 
immigrants work with higher levels of job insecurity and as a result have a higher risk 
of mental and physical health problems (Landsbergis, Grzywacz & LaMontagne, 2014; 
Quinlan & Sokas, 2009). On the other hand, there are theoretical gaps in the literature 
between flexible work life and related parameters in the society. How does the social 
relations associate with labor flexibility? What might be social costs of this? Without 
building a systemic understanding over more societal dimensions through social 
consequences, it is not possible to probe insecurity troubles, other than the health 
status of individuals, which are deeply rooted in every corner of the social sphere. 
C. Labor Precarity and the Dismantling of Solidarity 
Since the 1980s, European countries have applied labor law reforms with more 
flexibility and fewer minimum standards (via deregulation), which has had large-scale 
negative effects on fundamental social rights and workers’ protection (Clauwaert and 
Schomann, 2012). Kalleberg (2009) does not take flexibility as one-off phenomenon 
in the history and rather see the welfare period of 1940-1970 as an exceptional 
interregnum with relative certainty. Hence, “flexibility” is just one of the 
characteristics of long-term capitalism and largely dominant over “security”. With 
great success of neoliberalism, flexibility has just defeated security one more time in 
the history and the pendulum was reversed to the normal. 
For popular Marxist thinker Harvey (2005), the primary goal of neoliberal ideas and 
policies has been focusing on making the labor-markets more flexible in order to 
create a more profitable market system. He points to neo-conservatism which is vital 
for the sustainability of the inherently unstable and flexible neoliberalism, as an 
inevitable glue which bonds the neoliberal project and nationalism. For Harvey (2005, 
p.85): 
 “… the neoliberal state needs nationalism of a certain sort to survive. Forced 
to operate as a competitive agent in the world market and seeking to establish 
the best possible business climate, it mobilizes nationalism in its effort to 
succeed.”  
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The regime of informality/precarity is related to systematically changing employment 
relationships (Breman & Linden, 2014). However, broadly implying both a condition 
of precarious workers and a possibility for resistance, precarity refers to uncertainty, 
instability and insecurity, which are frequently invoked alongside the concepts like 
risk and vulnerability (Waite, 2009). The usage of the concept in reference to social 
devastation of precariousness has been increasing among academics, especially in 
the last decade. 
Some scholars think of precarity as, an idiosyncratic consequence of employment 
relations in terms of the labor-market positions of precarious workers, where it 
stands for longer hours with lower wages, a bigger risk of unemployment, less job 
satisfaction, and limited upward mobility and union coverage. This understanding of 
precarity often relates to OJI and is more likely to highlight the economic costs of 
precarity (Noack & Vosko, 2011; Kalleberg, 2009). However, Neilson and Rossiter 
(2005) argue that precarity is more than the positions of precarious workers in the 
labor-market. They look at flexibility in the sense of societal malaise concerning 
“ontological insecurity” (Butler, 2006). According to Sennett (2007), workers have 
started to lose touch with their self-reality in flexible management and the results 
have been “the loss of narrative” and the dismantling of long-term planning. This 
social and psychosocial understanding of precarity aims to reveal the sociological and 
philosophical aspects of precarity, which are very relevant to economic conditions. I 
will use the terms “economic precarity” and “social precarity”3 by utilizing these two 
interrelated approaches. 
Likewise, Barbieri (2009) in his investigation of employment flexibility, reviewed 
various studies on the transformation of the European labor-market, and found that 
new entrants and women face the highest levels of risk for experiencing labor-market 
precarity and therefore social exclusion. However, in the last a few years, labor 
precarity has also been interpreted as an “action framework”, “discursive practice” 
and “political toolbox” (Schram, 2013; Casas-Cortés, 2014). Scholars started to think 
that precarity provides a new kind of labor solidarity. This is a hope on the capacity 
                                                          
3 Social precarity is associated with higher risks of social exclusion and discussed in view of people’s 
attitudes (Gallie & Paugam, 2003). 
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of this uniting character of today’s oppressed classes to contribute universal 
mobilization. Some scholars have even attempting to redefine “class” anew in terms 
of precariousness (Standing, 2011, 2014). Although some street protests indicate 
limited level of mobilization among precarious workers even at the international 
level, it still seems like a tragic optimism to take precarity as resistance and solidarity 
provider. As Burawoy implied (2010), before celebrating internationalism, scholars 
need to develop a more realistic analysis of marketization and of the culture of new 
capitalism. While neoliberal flexibility imposes precarity, for Layton (2010), social 
traumas created by neoliberal subjectivity induce social perversion with the 
perversion of truth, followed by the disavowal and paradoxical denial of precarity 
through “the lie of self-sufficiency.” This perspective works for exclusive solidarity 
confronting an expanding “other” by the ideology of competitive individualism 
(Neilson, 2015). Whereas for neoliberalism, the success or failure of individual 
workers depends on “entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings (such as not 
investing significantly enough in one’s own human capital through education) rather 
than being attributed to any systemic property (such as the class exclusions usually 
attributed to capitalism)” (Harvey, 2005, p.65-6). Either for the individual or for the 
firm, the duality that appears between permanently and temporarily employed 
workers working together is also reflected in the downsizing of class-consciousness 
and resistance power (Pialoux & Beaud, 1999). For Wield (2014), responsibility for 
this downsizing belongs to the fissured (fragmented) workplace at the global and 
local levels. Some others have argued that automation, robotization, and 
computerization were the main factors behind the power loss of the working class. 
That is why, directly and indirectly, Castells (1997) and Sennett (2007) regarded 
technological transformations responsible for the decreasing ability of workers to act 
and reproduce themselves as a class. 
Labor scholars strongly emphasize migrants in their discussion of precarity because 
of their structural vulnerability. They provide “hyperflexible labor” and are regarded 
as “available when required, undemanding when not” (Anderson, 2010, p. 300). 
Considering the inability of immigrants to reject forms of exploitation that impose 
just one labor-market option and their deprivation of the same legal status with 
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natives, it makes sense to name the hyper-precarious lives of migrants as “modern 
slavery” (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson & Waite, 2015). The precariousness of immigrants 
is not limited to the work; it is also strongly related to their legal rights (Goldring & 
Joly, 2014). Accordingly, immigration detentions and deportations are other specific 
factors that directly increase migrant precarity (Martin, 2015). That is why precarity 
exceeds the limits of workplace and expands on all parts of social life. 
Although analyses on precarious labor of immigrants are important, they could not 
present the whole picture of social exclusion of immigrants and their social precarity 
without analysis of attitudes of natives. Labor scholars have not sufficiently expanded 
the discussion to the social precarity. What about their position in the mindset of 
native workers? Might they be channeling their own fears onto immigrants, who are 
being scapegoated as the cause of insecurity (Robinson & Barrera, 2012)? 
E. Age of Insecurity  
Sennett (2007, 2011) attributes such a Weberian origin for the welfare period, in 
which each member of the bureaucratic pyramid has a specific position and a static 
but specialized task with great contribution of “rationalized time”. On the one hand, 
the iron cage of welfare regimes implies strong control over the life of workers. On 
the other, it ensures that the workers are able to imagine developing long-term 
strategies for their progression and to keep on progressing by experience. 
However, when it comes to the flexible times, the centrality of experience at work 
dissolved and rising common value of potential ability gained more importance. 
Stability left its popularity to efficiency and came to evoke a static, old fashioned 
culture of work, since technological advancement (“the new page”) requires 
dynamic, fluid, present-oriented and task-oriented models rather than 
institutionalized, predefined, inefficient hierarchies. The structural change of work 
has been associated with three social deficits: lower loyalty to the firm, diminishing 
informal trust among workers, and the weakening of institutional knowledge (2007, 
p. 63). The idealized self of the new working man/woman carries no fear of failure, 
does not feel much attachment, and is highly motivated with possibilities. 
Nevertheless, practical consequences of this change call forth a new trouble: anxiety. 
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“Anxiety attaches to what might happen; dread attaches to what one knows 
will happen. Anxiety arises in ill-defined conditions, dread when pain or ill-
fortune is well defined. Failure in the old pyramid was grounded in dread; 
failure in the new institution is shaped by anxiety.” (Sennett, 2007, p.53) 
The pressure of new structure of work over anxious workers has increased social 
distances among them (p.56). Therefore, one significant domain of insecurity, in this 
framework, is the relationships. Not only in workplace, but also in their daily social 
spheres, the new structure affects people’s psychosocial well-being. 
Beck (1992), Bauman (2013), Giddens (1990), and Castells (1997) also read modern 
society under the shadow of the risks surrounding everyday life and the rising 
insecurity. Fevre (2007) and Doogan (2001) criticize this understanding, by claiming 
that Sennett’s arguments lack empirical evidences to generalize. Fevre also argue 
that, the power of the sociological theories of Sennett and his colleagues - based on 
rising risks - comes from their courage to exaggerate or the capacity of nightmares in 
social theory, hence, in reality the whole picture of workers is better than in the 
theories of pessimistic sociologists. The sociology of Sennett has been also criticized 
for being overly nostalgic for the past (Strangleman, 2007) and for ignoring the 
potential new age for human freedoms (Joas, 2004). Some other researchers support 
his fundamental focus on the transformation of the “individual experiences” of 
workers, which is under the attack of new culture of capitalism as Sennett describes 
(Tweedie, 2013). 
F. New Class Definition: “Precariat” 
For Standing, who takes anxiety as one of four detrimental effects of flexibility on 
individual workers, alongside anger, alienation, and anomie (2011, p. 19), this process 
was not a simple deregulation, but a re-regulation of the labor-market to break the 
resistance mechanisms and to dismantle workers’ solidarity (1997), as Polanyi (1944) 
argued much earlier. Insecurity, in Standing’s perspective, institutionalizes market 
regulation. Another implication is that even though the fragmental structure of the 
new oppressed class brings in “idleness,” it is still “class” in the making, and the 
neoliberal trend would never make them happy since it is built on their sufferings. 
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Standing defines three subgroups in the precariat: “overqualified unemployed 
youth,” “undocumented migrant labor” and “workers detached from the 
proletariat.” He explicitly differentiates the protected, long-term employed, secure 
working class (proletariat) from the creative precariat of the globalized world. He 
argues that the precariat lacks seven labor securities which the proletariat historically 
enjoyed: labor-market security, employment security, the security of working 
conditions, the security to gain and employ new skills, income security and 
representation security (the right to a collective voice in the labor-market) (2011, p. 
10). 
The main contribution of Standing to the ongoing discussion was establishing 
precariousness as a class-making and uniting characteristic. This has sparked a debate 
on class, around the question of whether neoliberal flexibility induces continuity or 
disengagement for the working class. Some labor scholars, rejecting the “precariat” 
of Standing, argue that the traditional working class shares all weaknesses of the 
precariat (Wright, 2016; Breman, 2013). Considering the tiny range of common 
interests of the three separate groups counted in the precariat, critics think that 
Standing exaggerates and they question how the material interests of the precariat 
differ from those of the proletariat. Another problem with the concept of precariat is 
the negative character of its definition. Class should be pertinent to the economic 
role and interests of its members, which was formulated neutrally (or sometimes 
positively) in previous theories (Seymour, 2012). The last criticism of precariat which 
can be observed in the literature is about the geographical bias of the term. Munck 
(2013) criticizes its eurocentrism, claiming that Standing’s evidence is mainly from 
the “North.” He criticizes inadequate concentration on the experience of the “South”, 
where the labor force seems obviously more “precarious”. In addition to all 
definitional troubles, some takes precarity as a condition of the proletariat rather 
than a class (Frase, 2013). There seems to be great doubt over its class-making 
capacity and the debate over the conceptualization continues. 
G. Looking for Immigrants and Anti-Immigrants 
Migrant issue and anti-immigrant attitudes are the two sides of the same coin. 
Negative attitudes towards immigrants are one of the most obvious aspects of social 
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exclusion. In fact, the effect of social exclusion of immigrants spreads all over the 
social space, even over labor movements irrespective of class-consciousness of the 
native workers. The comparative study of Lamont (2009) on French and American 
workers matters considering one of its crucial findings: with respect to the latter, 
French native workers, who had greater political consciousness against the ruling 
class, were paradoxically more anti-immigrant and even racist to some extent. 
Standing (2011) criticizes the secure proletariat in the same manner.  
This exclusion can be investigated in the critical viewpoint of the “new left” to the 
unequal struggle of the “old labor movements”. The new left scholars concentrate on 
how existing trade unions and socialist parties exclude women, racial/ethnic 
minorities and immigrants (Wood, 1995). Moreover, the “labor aristocracy” 
conceptualization of Lenin often has helped them in order to imply elite (white, 
aristocratic) labor (Hobsbawm, 2012). Another recently formulated criticism within 
the theoretical intersectionality debates focuses on the condition of people in the 
society who are located at the intersecting points of different oppressed identities, 
like being an immigrant and belonging to a lower social class (Walby, 2007). It seems 
that the exclusive “whiteness” (Fraser, 2000) in the firing line of the new left remains, 
and is still getting discussed in terms of today’s organization of work, working 
conditions, employment relations, and their social extensions. The hostility of 
individual native workers towards immigrants appears as the most crucial social 
extension of employment relations for immigrants.  
In this sense, this paper offers to prioritize individual-level analysis and sociological 
perspective to understand the relationship between SJI and AIA. While AIA scholars 
lack sociological imagination in their theories, SJI scholars empirically do not attribute 
sufficient importance to social hazards (increasing hostility) as consequences of high 
levels of insecurity. On the one hand, AIA scholars have not extensively utilized 
theories of subjective responses against labor-market transformations. On the other 
hand, though the concept of SJI is somewhat broader than PJI in the literature, it has 
been always applied within the same empirical context. I re-conceptualize it in the 
sense of the subjective responses of workers against the overall precarization at 
higher levels. It is still the individual fear towards the loss of jobs but on a countrywide 
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rather than a personal basis. In order to capture contextual differentiations, and not 
to sacrifice individual level for the details, my study contains separate models for 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, I propose to analyze AIA at 
the individual level because of one of my main arguments: the bridge between AIA 
and SJI can better be built on the reflection of systemic matters on the attitudes. In 
addition to enhancing empirically wide range of individual determinants for anti-
immigrant attitudes, comparing major factors related to different theories, this study 
theoretically binds AIA and SJI and constructs a link between increasing labor 
precarity and decreasing inner solidarity among today’s working-classes4, especially 
for the most suffering ones. 
Accordingly, I developed two theoretical arguments. Firstly, in addition to economic 
(and direct) cost of neoliberal flexibility over immigrants, native facet of social 
pressure produced by insecurity of non-standard employment relations is another 
(and indirect) cost for these “blameworthy” agents. It is namely the “dual cost.” More 
explicitly, precarity negatively affects immigrants in two forms. The first one comes 
from their position at the margin of the labor-market like women, youth and ethnic 
minorities and derived from economic precarity. The second one is that being the 
supposed cause of all worsening conditions in labor-market (job scarcity, low wages, 
long work hours etc.), which, triggered by neoliberal project, pushes AIA of native 
workers and feeds the social precarity. 
My second argument is that the connection between AIA and SJI presents evidence 
of the downsizing labor solidarity and class-consciousness in the “age of insecurity.” 
The flexible labor-market keeps workers continuously insecure which leads to less 
solidarity among native and immigrant labor. 
H. Assumptions and Hypothesis 
The interrelations between the three bodies of the literature in the theoretical 
framework of my analysis are in Figure 2, which also specifies where my empirical 
findings are located. In this  framework, flexibility stands for economic precarity in 
                                                          
4 Plural form of class is preferred while attributing subjects in order to avoid tautologies, regarding 
the diversity of working classes in the new age of capitalism (Wright, 1985). 
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connection to the theoretical literature on labor precarity (C) and SJI (B), and 
dismantling solidarity does the same for social precarity between labor (C) and AIA 
(A). AIA and SJI respectively represent the social precarity of immigrants and the 
economic precarity of natives. Hence, I investigate the social precarity of immigrants 
through the economic precarity of native workers. Social precarity of immigrant 
workers is assumed as a reflection of economic precarity of native workers. The 
analysis is expected to reveal that economically insecuritized native labor, in social 
sphere, is becoming the reason of a social cost over immigrants.  
While the focus is on the SJI of native workers for the emprical analysis which 
establishes the connection between (A) and (B) literatures, my theoretical focus is on 
understanding one of the crucial elements of the social precarity of today’s working 
classes.5 
In the light of all these theoretical implications, I expect to find SJI as the most 
effective factor on the attitudes of natives (H1). With its symbolic attribution to the 
“old left” and “old labor movements,” belonging to a trade union is expected to be 
insignificant (H2) since unions no longer provide social solidarity. OJI is expected to 
be insignificant since it is dominated by the feelings of individuals on SJI (H3). 
Interpersonal trust as a proxy of social integration theory (which is widely issued in 
                                                          
5This does not mean that social and economic precarity are reduced respectively to dismantling 
solidarity and flexibility. Rather, this differentiation is done to imply the foci and the limitations in this 
study. One may think social precarity of flexibility as “onthological insecurity" (Neilson & Rossiter, 
2005) and economic precarity of dismantling solidality as “falling wage shares” (Bengtsson & Ryner, 
2015). 
Figure 2: Theoretical Framework 
Dismantling 
Solidarity 
Flexibility 
C. Labor Precarity
A. Anti-Immigrant 
Attitudes
B. Subjective Job 
Insecurity
Analysis 
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the literature) is expected to be weakly sigificant (H4) since its effect is also thought 
to be explained by SJI. Education is expected to decrease AIA (H5).  
The variables of “concern about Europeans” and leftism (as a political view) are 
expected to positively affect attitudes towards immigrants (H6, H7) such that those 
who support the interests of all Europeans or have left-wing disposition is politically 
opposed to nationalist approaches, and vice versa. Therefore, they are expected to 
have lower levels of AIA. Most right-wing political parties in European countries, for 
instance, support leaving the European Union. Opennes to other Europeans seems 
as strongly related to positive attitudes towards immigrants. 
3. Methods 
The main schema of the analysis is based on three hierarchical models for each one 
of the three countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, and France) that vary 
historically and have different origins for immigrants. I build a hierarchical multi-
linear analysis with individual variables in order to comment on the overall 
explanatory powers of three separate groups of variables (which are control, attitude 
and job variables). One of the reasons I chose these countries is to broaden my 
discussion about if, how, and why the relationship between my major predictors and 
AIA varies for different migrant destinations in Europe. Comparing R-square changes 
by models and their significance, I will follow the question of which one of the 
attitude and the job variables have greater ability to predict the dependent variable: 
AIA index. The main independent variable of this research is SJI. In order to 
acknowledge the most commonly applied predictors of negative attitudes from a 
wider perspective and to compare their explanatory powers with respect to SJI, 
eighteen independent variables are included.  
A. Data 
In this research, I use the European Value Survey (2008-2010). Tilburg University and 
GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) have carried out the survey in four 
waves in the years 1981, 1990, 1999, and 2008. The dataset of this research is the 
last wave of the survey. For most of the countries, the data was collected in 2008, but 
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for a few in 2009 and 2010. It was in 2008 for France, in 2008/2009 for Germany and 
in 2009/2010 for the United Kingdom. The publishers described the survey’s area of 
interest as the “moral, religious, societal, political, work, and family values of 
Europeans” - I covered all of these fields while selecting the independent variables in 
the study. There are various characteristics of respondents from 47 countries in the 
dataset. The sample size is 66,281, with 477 variables extracted from interviews, 
which consisted of about 250 questions. 
B. Analytical Approach 
My empirical model uses a multivariate analysis based on the OLS regression. Since 
the index (AIA) is a normally distributed numeric variable, I chose to apply a linear 
model. The empirical model is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 
𝑦: AIA 
𝑥: SJI 
𝑧: All other control variables 
𝜀: Error term   
In order to exclude immigrant people’s attitudes against immigrants from my 
calculations, I carried out the analysis only for individuals who were born in the 
country where the data was collected. Generations of immigrants after the first one, 
are treated as native workers because they are also expected to have a fear about 
the loss of jobs in that country that might be caused by new comers. I preferred a 
recoded version of the age variable, for which the lowest category starts from 15, 
since the focus of my analysis is “working” classes. In addition, the study disregards 
unemployed people due to methodological limitations. Variables like income or job-
related occupational status are naturally unavailable for the unemployed, since these 
variables are proper only for employed respondents. After these exclusions, the 
sample sizes came down to 583 for Germany, 224 for the United Kingdom, and 639, 
for France. 
I recoded the values of all variables from smallest to largest and coded categorical 
ones as dummies. I apply three hierarchical models for each country. In the first 
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model, only socio-economic factors and general descriptive conditions are included. 
They are gender, age, income, education, marital status, number of children, health 
status, size of town and life satisfaction. In the second model, I use four more 
variables to cover the effect of some critical attitudes: the importance of God for 
people, political leaning, concern about Europeans and interpersonal trust. Finally, in 
the third model, I added up outstanding variables related to the job: occupational 
status, job satisfaction, belonging to a trade union, experience of unemployment, and 
SJI as the major independent variable. 
C. Variables 
i. Dependent Variable: Anti-Immigrant Attitude Index 
What I mean by AIA is the combination of some specific negative approaches to 
immigrants. The components of the dependent variable are formed by twelve 
questions. As descriptions of the component variables imply, native people’s AIA in 
this study do not have to consist of “hate” or unmediated “violent behavior”. Rather, 
I investigate “the negative attitude”, which smoothly promotes to dislike immigrants.  
Short descriptions of the component variables are as follows: 
1- Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality]. 
2- Immigrants undermine country’s cultural life. 
3- Immigrants increase crime problems. 
4- Immigrants are a strain on welfare system. 
5- Immigrants will become a threat to society. 
6- Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger. 
7- Immigrants living in your country: there are too many. 
8- Important: to have been born in [country]. 
9- Important: to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws. 
10- Important: to have [country nationality] ancestry. 
11- Important: to be able to speak [country language]. 
12- Important: to have lived in [country] for a long time. 
The range of first five variables were from 1 to 10 in the dataset with decreasing 
affirmation, and of the sixth and seventh were from 1 to 5, from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree. The range of other five variables were from 1 to 4, from very 
important to not important at all.  Each one of these twelve variables is standardized 
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before the combination. The Cronbach Alfa value is reliable to combine them all in 
one index. The number is 0.83. I summed standardized variables, initialized the range 
with the minimum point of zero, and divided the sum of the component variables by 
twelve. The resulting range of the index was 6.27 (from 0 to 6.27) for the three 
countries. 
ii. Independent Variable: Subjective Job Insecurity 
I re-conceptualized subjective job insecurity (SJI) as country-level fear of individuals 
towards the loss of jobs. Rather than PJI, conceptually the umbrella of SJI is more 
likely to be interpretable in the sense of working environment from broader 
perspective. Respondents were asked about their fear towards the loss of jobs in 
their country as part of a broader set of questions related to the European Union. In 
the questionnaire, it is like this: 
Some people may have fears about the building of the European Union.  I am going 
to read a number of things which people say they are afraid of. For each tell me if you 
- personally - are currently afraid of:  
The loss of jobs in [COUNTRY] 
SJI is mostly discussed in the form of perceived threat of unemployment as I 
described above in the literature chapter. However, this research treats it as 
individual fear towards the loss of jobs at a country level. A worker might have a 
secure job with no fear of loss of her/his current job, but still have a feeling of 
insecurity on her/his job maintenance in the long-run due to the possibility of 
countrywide crises. Here the wider level of the question helps us to cover deeper 
feelings of workers about loss of job, in a country-based context. What is more, since 
my focus is country-based contexts among the three European countries in this 
research, the fears of respondents about the building of the European Union are 
assumed as not violating the main argumentation. Even though the fear is about the 
European Union, it derives from the individual fear for loss of jobs in the country. 
Thus, while the fear is personal, the focus of the fear is national and the conveyer of 
the focus of the fear is Europeans.  
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Workers with more fear of losing their jobs on a country basis have greater SJI. Its 
range is from 1 to 10, the lowest to the highest. 
iii. Control Variables 
The categorical variables in the analysis are gender, marital status, belonging to trade 
unions, trust and having experienced unemployment. Being male, being married 
(with respect to the categories of registered partnership, widowed, divorced, 
separated and never married or never registered partnership), belonging to a union, 
having experienced unemployment, and having a positive disposition to trust others 
are coded as “1”, and the other values of the variables are left as control groups (“0”). 
Positive / negative dispositions to trust are represented in the dataset with the 
expressions of “most people can be trusted” or “you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people”. For the experience of unemployment, respondents are asked whether 
they have experienced unemployment of more than three months in the last five 
years. The variable is a proxy for OJI. 
The recoded age variable has six groups, as commonly used in previous literature (15-
24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65+). From rural to urban, with respect to the 
population, size of town where the interview was conducted is also recoded as one 
of eight separate categories (under 2,000, 2,000 – 5,000, 5,000 – 10,000, 10,000 – 
20,000, 20,000 – 50,000, 50,000 – 100,000, 100,000 – 500,000, and 500,000 and 
more). Monthly household income has been divided into twelve hierarchical 
categories and occupational status, nine.  The lowest category of occupational status 
is taken as the “routine workers” and the highest one is “larger employers”. The 
variable for education is formed as the highest educational level respondent attained 
within eight categories from “inadequately completed elementary school” to 
“university graduation with high degree.” Health status description and concern 
about Europeans (through the question of: “Do you feel concerned about the living 
conditions of Europeans?”) are represented in the scale from 1 to 5. The values of the 
health status variable is increasing as unhealthiness, from “very good” to “very poor”. 
Life satisfaction, job satisfaction, the importance of God or the religiosity 
(increasingly) of the respondents, political leaning (from “left” to “right”) are on a 
scale from 1 to 10.  The number of children is included just as it is.  
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4. Results 
In this chapter, I will present the migrant statistics and descriptive, bivariate, and 
multivariate results of my empirical analyses for three countries. 
Germany, the United Kingdom and France are typical immigrant destinations in 
Western Europe. The migrant share of their total population has been increasing 
since the 1990s for the three countries, and the number of immigrants since the 
1980s. In 2010, 14.4 percent of the German, 12.1 percent of the British, and 11.4 
percent of the French populations were comprised of immigrants (Table 1). 
Immigrants in Germany come mostly from Eastern European countries (like Romania 
and Poland), Turkey, Russia, and Kazakhstan. For the United Kingdom and France, 
immigrants come from geographically diverse range of places though many hail from 
their historical colonies. Since the colonies of the United Kingdom were distributed 
more widely over different continents, from sub-Saharan Africa to South Asia, one 
observe a more diverse range of immigrants than one does in France, where, Algeria 
and Morocco are two biggest sources of immigration.6 The three countries are 
actually not very different in terms of immigration at first glance. However, previous 
studies and my bivariate analysis both show crucial differences. 
Table 1: Descriptive Data 
  AIA SJI 
Political 
View 
Concern 
about 
Europeans 
GDP 
per 
Capita 
Unemployment 
Rate % 
Migrant Share 
% in 2010 
Germany 5.18 7.89 4.81 3.15 31,750 7,4   (2008) 14,4 
France  4.84 7.04 4.98 2.46 31,000 7,4   (2008) 11,4 
The United 
Kingdom 
5.33 8.09 5.33 2.2 27,600 7,6   (2009) 12,1 
AIA, SJI, political view, and concern about Europeans are variables in EVS (2008). I listed their means for each country in the 
table. I applied the T-test for each couple of countries for each variable. Except for SJI difference in Germany and the UK and 
political view difference in Germany and France, which are weakly significant, differences are strongly significant (with p-
value less than 0.001). I extracted the GDP and unemployment rate of the three countries from Eurostat, and migrant share 
from MPI. For the UK, since the EVS was conducted in 2009, I used the unemployment rate and GDP from 2009. For the 
migrant share, I used data from 2010, the closest year for which information was available. 
 
When it comes to the AIA of native working classes, the United Kingdom, the second 
most preferred destination of the three countries, rises to first place with the highest 
average of AIA. Germany follows the United Kingdom, and France comes third with 
                                                          
6Migration Policy Institute (MPI): https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ at 15.11.2017.  
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the least negative attitudes. The order of the SJI means of the countries is similar 
again, with the United Kingdom with the highest to France with the lowest. The close 
means of both SJI and AIA to their maximum levels demonstrate once again the 
importance of these two phenomena separately. For each country, negative attitudes 
and subjective job insecurities are substantial facts. 
Moreover, the GDP and unemployment rates of the countries seem to be close to 
one another. The means of political view and concern about Europeans fall into the 
same order, but in opposite directions. Considering that the value of the political view 
variable is increasing from “left” to “right”, leftist political views and concern about 
Europeans appear to be parallel for country ranks. Although the means of political 
view do not differentiate greatly by country, the difference between the highest 
(Germany) and the lowest (the United Kingdom) means of concern about Europeans 
seems remarkable for its small range. 
I have listed the descriptive statistics of all variables in Table 2. Another noteworthy 
difference between countries, in addition to concern about Europeans is about the 
trust variable. France has the smallest proportion for trust. In France, almost three-
fourths of respondents see people as not very trustable, while this proportion in 
Germany and the United Kingdom was similar at around three-fifths. As well as the 
difference between countries, the overall high level of mistrust is also worth 
mentioning. Like SJI, in France, the proportion of people experiencing unemployment 
(OJI) is also lower than it is in Germany and the United Kingdom, for which OJI levels 
are very close to each other. French native workers seem to suffer less from job 
insecurity and to have less negative attitudes towards newcomers. The ratio of trade 
union membership for native workers in the three countries is similar, at about 6 
percent. The descriptive results show that the number of workers in these countries, 
who experience unemployment for more than three mounts (OJI) is approximately 
three times that of people belonging to a trade union. The biggest variance among 
the variables in the three countries belongs to religiosity. This means that religiosity 
is the variable that varies the most in each country. The second biggest variance was, 
not surprisingly, occupational status.  
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I added separate correlation tables (Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5) for the three 
countries in order to broaden on bivariate results. I present correlation results by 
highlighting significant ones. Strength of a correlation (strong or weak) stands for the 
interval of the p-value. Subjective and objective job insecurities, both significantly 
correlate with lower levels of income and lower levels of occupational status in all 
three countries. The situation of people who work for lower wages is more 
precarious, like that of workers who are assigned an inferior job status. I found SJI 
and OJI to be gender indifferent. However, age is negatively correlated with OJI, but 
not significantly correlated with SJI except for in Germany. For Germany, both OJI and 
SJI have negative correlations with age. This means that younger natives have less 
objective security than older ones in all three countries and they also have more fear 
of losing jobs in Germany.  
Furthermore, education is another variable negatively correlated with SJI in the three 
countries. Higher educational levels correspond to a lower SJI, not surprisingly. 
Significant correlation also exists for OJI, but in opposite directions for countries. In 
Germany and the United Kingdom, OJI is negatively correlated with education, just 
like SJI, but for France the correlation is positive, unexpectedly. As I described before, 
the SJI of respondents is defined in sense of their fears about European Union. This 
explains its strong negative correlation in the three countries with concern about 
Europeans. More fear about European Union (via loss of jobs in that country) is 
associated with less concern about Europeans. However, it is very beyond the risky 
level which sometimes brings multi-collinearity trouble. The correlation between 
having concern about Europeans and OJI is only significant in Germany and less OJI is 
associated with higher concern.
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Results 
 
 
N Range Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Var. N Range Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Var. N Range Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Var.
age 1916 5 1 6 3.97 1.569 2.462 1383 5 1 6 3.9 1.641 2.692 1388 5 1 6 4.13 1.651 2.724
income 1702 10 1 11 6.23 1.806 3.262 1256 9 3 12 6.83 1.955 3.821 962 11 1 12 6.57 2.428 5.895
education 1929 6 2 8 5.32 1.354 1.833 1381 7 1 8 5.02 2.13 4.538 1330 7 1 8 4.31 1.885 3.553
number of children 1917 11 0 11 1.4 1.221 1.49 1383 12 0 12 1.74 1.516 2.299 1396 8 0 8 1.75 1.394 1.945
health status 1929 4 1 5 3.69 0.928 0.861 1382 4 1 5 3.87 0.925 0.855 1399 4 1 5 3.9 1.012 1.025
size of town 1932 4 1 5 2.76 1.303 1.697 1383 4 1 5 2.7 1.569 2.463 869 4 1 5 2.82 1.196 1.432
life satisfaction 1928 9 1 10 6.77 2.134 4.554 1382 9 1 10 7.07 2.076 4.311 1396 9 1 10 7.58 2.007 4.026
reigiosity 1873 9 1 10 3.98 3.178 10.1 1377 9 1 10 4.15 3.016 9.096 1376 9 1 10 4.68 3.196 10.22
political view 1681 9 1 10 4.81 1.719 2.957 1279 9 1 10 4.98 2.28 5.199 1119 9 1 10 5.33 1.814 3.291
concern about Europeans 1889 4 1 5 3.15 0.884 0.781 1379 4 1 5 2.46 1.02 1.041 1359 4 1 5 2.2 1.015 1.03
occupational status 1701 8 1 9 4.65 2.847 8.104 1317 8 1 9 5.37 2.871 8.24 1309 8 1 9 5.28 3.004 9.025
job satisfaction 983 9 1 10 7.56 1.727 2.983 741 9 1 10 7.3 1.88 3.533 630 9 1 10 7.51 2.023 4.091
subjective job insecurity 1900 9 1 10 7.89 2.456 6.033 1377 9 1 10 7.04 2.784 7.751 1356 9 1 10 8.09 2.571 6.612
AIA 1636 3.03 3.24 6.27 5.185 0.5691 0.324 1337 3.06 3.21 6.27 4.844 0.67074 0.45 1237 3.34 2.92 6.27 5.331 0.59764 0.357
Valid N (listwise) 583 639 224
Germany France The United Kingdom
1 0 1 0 1 0
gender (male) 52.6 47.4 45.4 54.6 42.2 57.8
marital status (married) 49.9 50.1 44.5 55.5 44.5 55.5
trust 38.5 61.5 26.3 73.7 40.6 59.4
belonging to a trade union 6.4 93.6 5.7 94.3 6.9 93.1
objective job insecurity 22.5 77.5 15 85 21.9 78.1
(experience of unemployment)
Germany France The United Kingdom
  All values in the lower section of the table are in terms of percentage. 
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Table 3: Correlations for Germany 
*P value ≤ 0.05, **P value ≤ 0.01, ***P value ≤ 0.001. 
In order to fit the table onto the page, I shortened variables as: income (inc.), education (educ.), marital status (MS), number of children (NoC), health status (HS), size of town (SoT), life satisfaction (LS), 
religiosity (relig.), political view (PV), concern about Europeans (CE), occupational status (OS), belonging to unions (BTU), and job satisfaction (JS). 
 
 
 
gender age inc. educ. MS NoC HS SoT LS relig. PV CE trust OS BTU JS OJI SJI
age -0.007
inc. 0.072** -0.048*
educ. 0.147*** 0.072** 0.316***
MS 0.057* 0.238*** 0.422*** 0.127***
NoC -0.113*** 0.405*** 0.081*** 0.043 0.31***
HS 0.048* -0.424*** 0.268*** 0.055* 0.042 -0.157***
SoT -0.032 -0.062** 0.023 0.106*** -0.135*** -0.098*** 0.007
LS -0.009 -0.022 0.381*** 0.187*** 0.189*** 0.031 0.39*** 0.014
relig. -0.141*** 0.138*** 0.148*** -0.055* 0.101*** 0.135*** 0.003 -0.088*** 0.244***
PV 0.111*** -0.025 0.077** -0.101*** 0.011 -0.008 0.042 -0.095*** 0.027 0.21***
CE -0.045* 0.08*** 0.043 0.122*** 0.037 0.018 0.08*** 0.046* 0.162*** 0.14*** -0.091***
trust -0.007 -0.013 0.14*** 0.123*** 0.048* -0.005 0.149*** -0.053* 0.262*** 0.153*** -0.038 0.177***
OS -0.05* 0.041 0.346*** 0.564*** 0.105*** 0.032 0.104*** 0.116*** 0.219*** 0.082*** -0.045 0.117*** 0.16***
BTU 0.096*** 0.014 0.066** 0.054* 0.049* 0.023 -0.014 0.002 0.042 -0.04 0.001 -0.019 -0.008 0.033
JS 0.016 0.04 0.22*** 0.179*** 0.087** 0.028 0.269*** -0.017 0.516*** 0.152*** -0.004 0.12*** 0.145*** 0.159*** -0.037
OJI 0.015 -0.162*** -0.331*** -0.175*** -0.129*** -0.034 -0.114*** -0.032 -0.368*** -0.222*** -0.061* -0.148*** -0.17*** -0.241*** -0.069** -0.14***
SJI -0.025 -0.073** -0.104*** -0.163*** 0.002 -0.018 0.015 -0.025 -0.113*** 0.021 0.073** -0.09*** -0.139*** -0.167*** -0.033 -0.094** 0.133***
AIA 0.023 0.1*** -0.115*** -0.251*** -0.032 -0.026 -0.038 -0.096*** -0.161*** 0.031 0.288*** -0.147*** -0.176*** -0.275*** -0.035 -0.078* 0.059* 0.367***
Correlations for Germany
2
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Table 4: Correlations for France 
*P value ≤ 0.05, **P value ≤ 0.01, ***P value ≤ 0.001. 
In order to fit the table onto the page, I shortened variables as: income (inc.), education (educ.), marital status (MS), number of children (NoC), health status (HS), size of town (SoT), life satisfaction (LS), 
religiosity (relig.), political view (PV), concern about Europeans (CE), occupational status (OS), belonging to unions (BTU), and job satisfaction (JS). 
 
 
gender age inc. educ. MS NoC HS SoT LS relig. PV CE trust OS BTU JS OJI SJI
age -0,043
inc. 0.133*** -0.055*
educ. 0,027 -0.41*** 0.4***
MS 0.064* 0.243*** 0.334*** -0,016
NoC -0.107*** 0.471*** -0,003 -0.255*** 0.344***
HS 0,041 -0.324*** 0.229*** 0.261*** 0.053* -0.15***
SoT -0,017 -0.096*** 0.093*** 0.185*** -0.163*** -0.148*** -0,015
LS 0,02 -0.071** 0.19*** 0.073** 0.141*** -0,04 0.32*** -0,025
relig. -0,153 0.234*** -0.1*** -0.137*** 0,05 0.172*** -0.126*** 0,045 0,011
PV 0,027 0.111*** 0.073* -0,042 0.066* 0.058* 0,014 -0.071* 0,01 0.212***
CE 0,02 0.058* 0.107*** 0.173*** 0,008 -0,052 0,047 0.132*** 0.063* 0.064* -0.09***
trust -0,029 0,025 0.147*** 0.203*** 0,028 0,021 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.089*** -0,041 -0.112*** 0.207***
OS 0,02 0.07* 0.419*** 0.481*** 0.126*** -0,04 0.11*** 0.191*** 0.084** 0,007 0,051 0.22*** 0.241***
BTU 0,048 0,024 0.12*** 0.068* 0,034 -0,027 -0,012 0.068* 0,042 -0.056* -0.156*** 0,046 0.125*** 0.075**
JS -0,002 0.025 0.142*** -0,011 0.11** 0,05 0.116** -0.073* 0.374*** 0,043 0.124*** -0,027 -0,007 0.087* -0.093*
OJI -0,061 -0.243*** -0.156*** 0.092*** -0.127*** -0.146*** 0,025 0.075** -0.085** -0,021 -0.08** 0,001 -0.057* -0.085** -0.068* -0,063
SJI -0,069 -0,006 -0.22*** -0.246*** -0,031 0,038 -0.097*** -0.092*** -0.055* 0,023 -0,004 -0.186*** -0.193*** -0.292*** -0.063* -0,014 0,049
AIA 0,01 0.212*** -0.214*** -0.375*** 0,043 0.138*** -0.182*** -0.161*** -0.112*** 0.122*** 0.367*** -0.237*** -0.363*** -0.274*** -0.169*** 0,023 -0.056* 0.335***
Correlations for France
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Table 5: Correlations for the United Kingdom 
*P value ≤ 0.05, **P value ≤ 0.01, ***P value ≤ 0.001. 
In order to fit the table onto the page, I shortened variables as: income (inc.), education (educ.), marital status (MS), number of children (NoC), health status (HS), size of town (SoT), life satisfaction (LS), 
religiosity (relig.), political view (PV), concern about Europeans (CE), occupational status (OS), belonging to unions (BTU), and job satisfaction (JS). 
 
 
 
 
gender age inc. educ. MS NoC HS SoT LS relig. PV CE trust OS BTU JS OJI SJI
age 0.037
inc. 0.101** -0.147***
educ. 0.059* -0.173*** 0.452***
MS 0.076** 0.148*** 0.458*** 0.107***
NoC -0.081** 0.314*** 0.006 -0.124*** 0.221***
HS -0.01 -0.28*** 0.292*** 0.184*** 0.095*** -0.104***
SoT -0.01 -0.087* -0.062 0.033 -0.153*** -0.026 -0.044
LS -0.064* 0.071** 0.179*** 0.068* 0.145*** 0.068* 0.288*** -0.08*
relig. -0.139*** 0.315*** -0.112*** -0.015 0.041 0.145*** -0.117*** -0.016 0.062*
PV -0.004 0.105*** 0.04 -0.084** 0.094** 0.075* 0.063* -0.073* 0.082** 0.109***
CE 0 0.02 -0.018 0.093*** 0.017 -0.019 0.042 -0.051 0.045 0.148*** -0.018
trust 0.037 0.031 0.18*** 0.184*** 0.095*** 0.004 0.086*** -0.033 0.12*** 0.001 -0.063* 0.065*
OS -0.014 0.045 0.442*** 0.501*** 0.136*** -0.034 0.121*** -0.008 0.078** 0.054 0.065* 0.092*** 0.138***
BTU 0.077** -0.016 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.036 -0.04 0.055* 0.065 0.029 -0.025 -0.072* 0.018 0.063* 0.039
JS -0.075 0.023 0.124** 0.112** 0.029 0.006 0.224*** -0.032 0.398*** 0.144*** -0.004 0.06 0.046 0.185*** 0.001
OJI -0.032 -0.262*** -0.321*** -0.105*** -0.189*** -0.049 -0.153*** 0.089** -0.222*** -0.085** -0.04 -0.011 -0.064* -0.18*** -0.097*** -0.084*
SJI -0.038 0.022 -0.153*** -0.261*** -0.046 0.026 -0.117*** -0.045 -0.105*** 0.022 0.176*** -0.106*** -0.126*** -0.136*** -0.094*** -0.097* 0.022
AIA 0.022 0.189*** -0.217*** -0.385*** -0.02 0.115*** -0.12*** -0.053 -0.103*** 0.054 0.231*** -0.201*** -0.226*** -0.22*** -0.118*** -0.057 -0.001 0.475***
Correlations for the United Kingdom
3
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Moreover, the trust variable in the three countries is similar and negatively correlated with 
SJI, within the highest significance levels. More trust of others is related to less SJI. Again, 
except for Germany, OJI and trust correlation is insignificant. Experiencing unemployment is 
negatively associated with trust in Germany. Therefore, one might argue that precarity in 
people’s jobs creates social mistrust. What is more, OJI and SJI strongly correlate to each other 
only for Germany. The correlations in the United Kingdom and France are insignificant. On the 
other hand, occupational status and education variables powerfully correlate with OJI and SJI 
in the three countries. Higher levels of education predictably indicate higher occupational 
status. 
For AIA, the significance levels of correlations are generally high. Gender does not have 
significant correlations with AIA in any of the countries. Age positively correlates with AIA in 
all three countries, and the correlations are strongly significant. Older people have higher 
levels of negative attitudes against newcomers. Income negatively correlates with AIA. 
Individuals at higher income levels seem more positive towards immigrants. Education has 
strongly significant (negative) correlations with AIA, with one of the greatest coefficients in 
each country, especially for the United Kingdom and France. Not for Germany but for France 
and the United Kingdom, having more children, unhealthiness and not belonging to a trade 
union are significantly associated with more negative attitudes. They are insignificant in 
Germany. While smaller town size is related to more negative attitudes in Germany, it is 
insignificant for the other two countries. Higher levels of life satisfaction seem to bring more 
openness to newcomers for all three countries. The correlation of religiosity with AIA is only 
significant in France, and there, it is strongly significant. The correlations of political view, 
concern about Europeans, and trust with AIA are strongly significant in the three countries. 
Especially for France, however, the coefficients of political view and trust variables are very 
high. People from the upper levels of occupational status seems to have less negative attitudes 
in the three countries. Interestingly, belonging to trade unions in France and the United 
Kingdom is significantly associated with high levels of AIA. OJI is weakly correlated with more 
AIA in Germany, less so in France and not at all in the United Kingdom. SJI for all three 
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countries, on the other hand, positively and strongly correlates with AIA as one of the highest 
coefficients in each. 
In sense of multi-collinearity problem, correlation values are proper to go through multivariate 
analysis. They are all beyond 0.7, which is widely accepted threshold. Bivariate analysis works 
for understanding binary relations, but without controlling for all variables in one analysis, it 
is misleading. As the final step of result chapter, I added the OLS regression table (Table 6) in 
order to control the variables and to present the comparative explanatory power of each 
factor for each country. All R-Square values (including R-Square changes of additional steps) 
are strongly significant and much bigger than sufficient levels. 
Among the control variables, education seems to be the most remarkable factor. For the three 
countries, in the first and the second models, its effect on AIA is strongly significant. However, 
in the third model, with the contribution of the job variables, the power of education seems 
to be explained out in Germany and France. In the United Kingdom, education still maintains 
its significance in the third model, but at lower levels. The number of children is insignificant 
in each model in this research. Gender is significant only in Germany and only in the first model 
with small levels. Income is insignificant in each country in the third model, while in the first 
and the second ones it is just significant for France. The same is true of town size. It is just 
significant for the first model in France. For the life satisfaction, the same thing occurs for 
Germany. The explanatory power (or coefficients) of age and income variables in three 
countries and health status in the United Kingdom display unexpected increases in additional 
models, namely suppression effect. This means that the power of these variables are 
suppressed in initial models. However, further investigation is needed to understand its 
background, which is beyond the scope of this research. 
When it comes to the attitude variables, which are added in the second model, the overall R-
Square change in France is the greatest. The R-Square value increases more than three times. 
Its rise is more than two times in Germany and around two times in the United Kingdom. 
Religiosity is insignificant for the countries. Considering the huge significance for the religiosity 
variable in France in the correlations, one may argue that its correlation with AIA is 
corresponded by other variables.
  
 
 
*P value ≤ 0.05, **P value ≤ 0.01, ***P value ≤ 0.001.
Beta Std. Beta Beta Std. Beta Beta Std. Beta Beta Std. Beta Beta Std. Beta Beta Std. Beta Beta Std. Beta Beta Std. Beta Beta Std. Beta
(constant) 5.61 - 5.03 - 4.33 - 5.83 - 5.39 - 4.55 - 5.66 - 5.31 - 4.17 -
gender (male) 0.09 (0.08)* 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.05 (0.03) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.09 (0.07) 0.12 (0.09) 0.05 (0.04)
age 0.04 (0.09)* 0.05 (0.11)** 0.04 (0.09)* -0.0 (-0.00) 0.04 (0.07)* 0.06 (0.10)** 0.03 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) 0.07 (0.13)*
income 0.01 (0.03) -0.0 (-0.0) 0.01 (0.04) -0.0 (-0.08)* -0.04 (-0.10)** -0.01 (-0.04) -0.00 (-0.00) -0.00 (-0.00) 0.02 (0.07)
education -0.09 (-0.21)*** -0.08 (-0.18)*** -0.03 (-0.07) -0.09 (-0.22)*** -0.06 (-0.16)*** -0.02 (-0.07) -0.14 (-0.41)*** -0.11 (-0.32)*** -0.05 (-0.16)**
marital status (married) -0.02 (-0.01) -0.03 (-0.03) -0.07 (-0.06) 0.07 (0.05) 0.05 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) -0.17 (-0.13) -0.17 (-0.13)* -0.18 (-0.14)*
number of children -0.03 (-0.07) -0.03 (-0.07) -0.02 (-0.05) 0 (0.00) -0.01 (-0.02) -0.01 (-0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
health status 0.05 (0.08) 0.04 (0.06) 0.03 (0.04) -0.02 (-0.03) -0.02 (-0.03) -0.02 (-0.02) 0.09 (0.09) 0.10 (0.11)* 0.09 (0.10)*
size of town -0.03 (-0.07) -0.01 (-0.03) -0.02 (-0.05) -0.04 (-0.11)** -0.02 (-0.05) -0.00 (-0.01) -0.06 (-0.11) -0.04 (-0.08) -0.02 (-0.04)
life satisfaction -0.03 (-0.12)** -0.02 (-0.07) -0.01 (-0.05) -0.02 (-0.07) -0.02 (-0.05) -0.02 (-0.06) -0.01 (-0.03) -0.01 (-0.04) -0.01 (-0.05)
reigiosity -0.00 (-0.00) -0.00 (-0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.07) 0.02 (0.09)
0.11 (0.34)*** 0.10 (0.30)*** 0.10 (0.34)*** 0.10 (0.33)*** 0.10 (0.26)*** 0.07 (0.19)***
concern about Europeans -0.00 (-0.00) -0.00 (-0.00) -0.10 (-0.14)*** -0.06 (-0.09)** -0.18 (-0.25)*** -0.15 (-0.21)***
trust -0.14 (-0.12)*** -0.09 (-0.08)* -0.38 (-0.26)*** -0.30 (-0.21)*** -0.18 (-0.13)* -0.12 (-0.09)
occupational status -0.01 (-0.09)* -0.02 (-0.10)** -0.03 (-0.13)*
belonging to unions -0.04 (-0.02) -0.10 (-0.04) -0.06 (-0.03)
job satisfaction -0.00 (-0.00) -0.00 (-0.00) 0.00 (0.01)
-0.02 (-0.01) -0.09 (-0.05) 0.00 (0.00)
0.07 (0.31)*** 0.06 (0.28)*** 0.10 (0.42)***
political view (from right to left)
0.08***
Germany France The United Kingdom
control variables
attitude variables
job variables
R Square 0.21*** 0.31*** 0.11*** 0.36*** 0.44*** 0.22***
objective job insecurity (OJI)
subjective job insecurity (SJI)
R Square Change 0.25*** 0.08*** - 0.18*** 0.16***
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0.40*** 0.57***
0.13*** 0.09***- -
Table 6: Results of Multivariate Analysis 
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Political view has high levels of significance in the three countries in both the second 
and the third model. Even though the explanatory power of political view decreases 
somewhat in the third model in each country, it is one of the variables with the 
highest overall coefficients. While in France it is the most powerful variable, it is the 
second most influential variable in Germany and the third in the United Kingdom. The 
strength of concern about Europeans and trust variables change from country to 
country. Concern about Europeans is insignificant for Germany, very significant for 
the United Kingdom (as the second most influential variable), and moderately 
significant for France in the final model. Trust, on the other hand, is significant with 
the highest levels as the third powerful factor in France, but does not sustain its 
significance in the last model in the United Kingdom and Germany. In the final model, 
its significance is weak in Germany and it is insignificant in the United Kingdom. 
For the job variables, the R-Squares in the three countries again significantly increase. 
While the biggest contribution of the job variables is in the United Kingdom, the 
smallest is in France. Belonging to a trade union, job satisfaction, and OJI are 
insignificant in all three countries. Regarding the significant correlations between 
belonging to trade unions and AIA in the United Kingdom and France, other factors 
like religiosity seem to matched its effect. Occupational status in each country is 
consistently but weakly associated with AIA. SJI, however, strongly and significantly 
predict AIA in each. It is the most powerful variable in Germany and the United 
Kingdom and the second in France, after political view.  
All in all, both political disposition to the right and the SJI in the country strongly 
explain individual negative attitudes towards immigrants for all three countries. 
While interpersonal trust does the same strongly in France but weakly in Germany, 
having more concern about Europeans does so strongly in the United Kingdom and 
moderately in France. The order of the variables with respect to their explanatory 
powers in each country is given in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Order of Major Variables 
Order of Major 
Variables* 
Germany France The United Kingdom 
1st Subjective Job Insecurity Political view Subjective Job Insecurity 
2nd Political view Subjective Job Insecurity 
Concern about 
Europeans 
3rd Age Trust Political view 
4th Occupational Status Age Education 
5th Trust Occupational Status Marital Status 
6th - 
Concern about 
Europeans 
Age 
7th - - Occupational Status 
8th - - Health Status 
 *I only covered major variables that I found to be significant in each country, and have ordered them with 
respect to their explanatory powers.  
Those in italics are strongly significant (with p-values less than 0.001).  
The age and occupational status variables interestingly have equal coefficients in three countries. To show them 
all in order, I put age above. 
 
 
In view of R-Square changings in additional models, attitudes give the impression that 
they are more important for France in prediction of AIA, than they are in the United 
Kingdom and Germany. In Germany, the job and the attitude factors appear to 
explain AIA equally well. For the United Kingdom, the overall explanatory power of 
the job variables seems bigger than that of the attitudes variables. 
5. Discussion 
While results in Germany and the United Kingdom verify the first hypothesis that SJI 
is the most prominent factor in terms of AIA of natives, this is not the case in France. 
The variable with the biggest explanatory power is political view for France. 
Nevertheless, the (standardized) coefficients of SJI in France also seems high. 
Although for the United Kingdom the dominance of SJI over all other variables is 
obvious, a second powerful variable (political view) comes just behind SJI in Germany. 
The results confirm the second hypothesis, which assumed belonging to a trade union 
is no longer an important factor in the determination of attitudes of working classes, 
for the attitudes of native workers towards immigrants in the three countries 
examined here. While the United Kingdom has the highest union density percentage 
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with 27%, it is 18.8% and 7.9% for Germany and France7, respectively. The United 
Kingdom with the highest AIA mean has the highest union density. This is another 
indicator of ineffectiveness of unions in terms of solidarity, since the union 
membership seemingly does not rise solidarity among native and immigrant workers. 
The third hypothesis assumed that OJI would be insignificant, which held for all three 
countries. This implies that negative approaches against immigrants are not limited 
to material conditions, instead they are most likely connected to how workers 
perceive the potential risks behind those material conditions. However, the statistical 
operationalization for OJI (due to data restrictions) is insufficient to claim that the 
effect of SJI dominated that of OJI. Objective insecurity needs to be covered beyond 
the experience of unemployment with a wider range of variables. 
When it comes to the fourth hypothesis, which expects weak explanatory power for 
the trust variable, this is only verified in Germany. While it is one of the most 
prominent factors for France, its weak significance in the second model disappears 
after adding the job variables for the United Kingdom. Therefore, one has sufficient 
evidence to claim that, the power of trust diverges greatly for these countries and it 
seems not convincing to generate the overall explanation of AIA through 
interpersonal trust. 
The fifth hypothesis, my expectation for a positive effect of education on the 
openness of natives, which is also one of the widely accepted findings of previous 
literature, seems not to be the case in France and Germany. Until the second model, 
one could claim that education has greatly decreases AIA. However, the job variables 
evidently attenuated the effect of education. Though significance levels of education 
decrease in all countries, for the United Kingdom it still matters in the third model. 
Hence, the outcome validates the fifth hypothesis only for the United Kingdom and 
the educational levels of workers do not perform as I had expected and as earlier 
studies had suggested they would.  
                                                          
7 “Trade union density” data is extracted from the OECD website for 2009. 
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The sixth and the seventh hypotheses, which supposed that there would be a positive 
impact of concern about Europeans and political leaning from the right to the left on 
openness towards immigrants, are verified in France and the United Kingdom. 
However, for Germany, surprisingly, political view and concern about Europeans do 
not synchronously performed. Only the seventh one is true but the sixth one is 
rejected. The openness to other Europeans is not relevant to AIA in Germany. In order 
to understand the reason behind the differentiating tendency of Germany’s 
distinctiveness on these points, utilizing further investigations and literature is 
needed. Nonetheless, this is beyond the scope of this research. 
Analyzing the nationhood of Germany and France comparatively, Brubaker (1990) 
coded French nationality as based on political institutions. French type nationhood 
and the French nation-state have been built up under the shadow of French political 
history, which is vital for the prominent political values of all Western societies. In 
terms of the first hypothesis on SJI, which seems not valid for France, the theory of 
Brubaker might help to understand the dominance of French political attitudes. 
France, for Brubaker (1990), appears as the hometown of the modern democratic 
and bureaucratic revolutions. He offers two diverging typologies in his book, 
representing two types of nationalism for all Europe: Germany and France. His theory 
rests on the traditional interpretations of citizenship and relevant immigration 
policies. He explains immigration policies with respect to the political history and 
cultural legacy of those countries. Political institutions and the state are at the center 
of “assimilationist” French nationhood versus “differentialist” Germany, for which 
ethnic-cultural attachment is more important. Their state-centered and volk-
centered nationhood has brought different tolerance levels for their legal openness 
towards citizenship seekers. In this regard, by utilizing the theories of Lepsius (1985) 
and Anderson (1983) on nationalism, Brubaker (1990, p.4) says: “In Germany the 
‘conceived order’ or ‘imagined community’ of nationhood and the institutional 
realities of statehood were sharply distinct; in France they were fused. In Germany 
nationhood was an ethnocultural fact; in France it was a political fact.” 
Even though many legal reforms have been carried out in Europe since the book of 
Brubaker was published, especially on the differentialist immigration policy of 
 39 
 
Germany from 2000s such as the development of birthright citizenship, Brubaker’s 
theory still helps to understand the significance of political attitudes in France 
regarding politics-based historical development of French nationhood. In this 
respect, his theoretical tolerance for France and the structure of the book reveals his 
more positive interest on France regarding that it contributes an opportunity to 
accept immigrants as equal citizens by the blessing of assimilation. While writing on 
French nationhood he says “… institutionally it went much further than its British or 
German counterparts in the legal and political assimilation of metropolitan and 
overseas regimes, aiming at the construction of ‘la plus grande France.’” (1990, p.11). 
In the sociological projection of this framework, then, political triggers exist more 
significantly than all other factors in the historical shaping of French nationality and, 
therefore, of the attitudes towards immigrants waiting for that purposeful 
assimilation. Assimilation becomes a blessing rather than a curse here. Another 
evidence supporting this thesis is that France also has the lowest mean for AIA (Table 
1) among the three countries.  
In addition to the dominance of political view in France, R-square changes specifically 
signify the significance of one group of variables, which are related to the attitudes, 
including political view. One can follow the traces of significances of both attitude 
variables against job variables and political view against SJI in France by historical 
strength of left and labor movements in there, and French Republicanism. Although 
lower classes of France have experienced a reduction of their benefits and political 
power during Neoliberal regime like the ones of other European countries, France 
still seems to make difference in terms of remaining capacity of workers in building 
political mobilization (Lamont, 2009). While interviewing workers in United States 
and France comparatively, Lamont finds that French workers extremely attach 
importance to labor solidarity. Solidarity for them, “is often a form of resistance that 
coworkers develop” (2009, p.166), and they perceive it as a struggle for the benefit 
of others and against injustice. On the one hand, they feel more responsible toward 
society than their American counterparts do. Attitudes towards immigrants, on the 
other hand, were definitely more complicated and equivocal in France. Lamont never 
defines French type approach towards immigrants as having more tolerance, unlike 
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Brubaker. In this study, I utilize from her emphasis on politically motivated French 
workers and her explanations for French anti-immigrants in terms of Republicanism. 
In French Republicanism, which is a condition for anti-immigrant boundaries, the 
state is a neutral agent above particular interests of individuals, which is “embodying 
universal reason and acting for the benefit of an undifferentiated mass of equal 
citizens” (p.186). Citizens are individuals here, not group members, and “individuals 
are considered to be equal citizens, independently of their cultural, natural, or social 
characteristics” (p.186). 
This has an intrinsic relationship with the understanding of appointing France with 
the role of civilizing humanity as the superior culture. Lamont mentions on the 
difference between British colonial project, giving cultural autonomy of its subjects, 
and French colonial motivation to make barbarians part of humanity by assimilating 
(p.185). In contrast with Brubaker, who remarks culture-free but politically unified 
French nationhood, She claims there is only one cultural identity is allowed in France. 
Republicanism is taken as a powerful warranty against discriminations and the French 
do really care about defining themselves as anti-racist (p.194-9). However, Lamont 
argues it is just another kind of racism, for which she appreciates ethnicity-free 
structure, by the decoupling of the skin color and racism. It is possible to name this 
racism as “color-blind political racism”. Veil ban in 2010, which was not even 
discussed in the United Kingdom and Germany, can be understood in this sense. In 
Lamont’s research, the significance of ideological origins of immigrants creates a 
sharp distinction between the non-assimilability of North African Muslim immigrants 
and assimilability of European immigrants (p.183-6). The pursuit of ideological-
political homogeneity in France definitely covers religiosity, which was also one of 
the attitude variables of my study. 
Self-identification of politically motivated French workers also might have created 
somewhat exceptionality. Lamont (2009, p.216) says only few of them identified with 
the middle class. “They are less likely to blame minority group members” (p.198) 
because of their powerful socialist tradition in France, and have more structural way 
of explanations for the migrant issue. They share an “antimarket position”, which 
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highlights “the importance of recognizing the dignity of people regardless of their 
labor-market positions” (p.196-7). Neither money one earn nor power one have is 
sufficient to make her/him French, but the common values do. These characters of 
overall political culture of the working classes in France seem to decease AIA a little 
bit and operate a different kind of AIA. 
Contrasting the distinguishing characters of French society, the study of Soysal 
(1994), as being not in opposition to Brubaker, but as being examination of the core 
concepts in his book, argued citizenships and nationalisms are more likely to be 
converging in Europe. One recent evidence from the most preferred migrant 
destination countries in Europe that supports her argument is that since 1 September 
20088, in order to gain citizenship, immigrants have to pass various exams on the 
language and, the legal and societal system of the country.9 However, the findings of 
my research on French case provide evidence that points to the remaining 
uniqueness of France. 
When it comes the case of Germany, some scholars take German identity as having 
not only nationalistic aspects but also patriotic dimensions, which do not trigger 
negative attitudes towards immigrants and are more powerful than the former in the 
country (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). The historical experience of colonization and having 
many immigrants from previously colonized territories might result in European 
identity acting as a sanctuary for British and French societies, in the shadow of the 
un-wanted history. Not having this historical background as much as other two, 
German nationhood seems not to contain that reflexive correlation between national 
hostility and European sanctuary. Results show that sharing European identity 
(concern about Europeans) does not say anything about anti-immigration in 
Germany, in contrast with France and the United Kingdom. It is the case in Germany 
since the great mean of the variable implies that the concern about Europeans is 
                                                          
8 Like France and United Kingdom, Germany also started to apply these tests. (Algan, Dustmann, Glitz 
& Manning, 2010). 
9 For deeper and more recent discussions on nationalism, immigrants and citizenship, see Shachar 
(2009) and Joppke (2010).  
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more likely a common sense (Table 1). Nevertheless, the uniqueness of Germany 
seems to exceed the interest of this study and definitely needs to deeply analysed. 
Comparing R-Square changes among the three countries, the attitude variables have 
their strongest contribution in France, as discussed above. While Germany displays a 
moderate position, the contribution of the job variables in the United Kingdom is the 
most remarkable out of the groups of variables (even seems greater than the 
explanatory contribution of the attitude variables considering exponential rise of R-
Squares from one model to the next one). Most of the power of the job variables is 
obviously coming from the SJI. The standardized coefficient of the variable is double 
that of the second most powerful variable in the country. In order to appreciate the 
dissimilarity of the United Kingdom reflexing in the supremacy of job insecurity, one 
should examine the variation of labor-market policies for the three countries. In 
terms of labor-market deregulations, the labor-market policies of the United 
Kingdom presents have notable differences from those of France and Germany. 
Public expenditures on labor-market policies, as shown in Figure 3, shows how much 
less the United Kingdom spends compared to the other European countries. 
The activeness of labor-market policy often implies greater regulation and active 
support for more vulnerable workers or unemployed people. The British labor-
market has been widely known as having one of the less active programs among 
European countries (Kluve, 2010). There are different types of active and passive 
Figure 3: Public Expenditures 
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Source: Eurostat (2018) 
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programs, like training or out-of-work income, with varying level of activeness. More 
than half10 of all labor-market policy expenditures in the United Kingdom go to job-
search programs, which are some of the most passive types of worker support 
programs (Kluve, 2010, p.906). The shares for France and Germany are respectively 
9.3 and 10.6 percent. Furthermore, in 2009, social spending, which comprises 
benefits for “low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed, or 
young persons,” was also the lowest11 for the United Kingdom among the three 
countries (OECD, 2018).  
The United Kingdom is one of the few relatively unregulated labor-markets in Europe 
(Kalleberg, 2003), and it had one of the fastest deregulation processes during the 
1980s (Atkinson, 1987). In the famous classification of Esping-Andersen (1990) on 
different types of welfare states, while Germany and France belong to the 
conservative regime family (with medium level of decommodification), the United 
Kingdom is defined as having one of the liberal welfare markets. Since the early times 
of neoliberal flexibility in the labor-market policy of the United Kingdom, there has 
been not much constraint on the expansion of temporary (non-standard and less 
regulated forms of) work; in contrast with France and Germany (Hakim, 1990, p.161).  
Therefore, the prominence of job insecurity in predicting negative attitudes towards 
immigrants in the United Kingdom is not surprising and very much consistent with 
the major argument of this thesis. The market pressure on the native labor force 
prompts anti-immigrant approaches in a psychosocial reflection of more structural 
socio-economic conditions. The victory of deregulation capital-labor relationship in 
the 1980s is not a new trend in history, but the history of their relationship was cut 
off by an interregnum within welfare period (Kalleberg, 2009). However, the real 
victory of capitalism, which is also attaining its historical peak, is that the neoliberal 
virtues enfeebled the capacity of working classes to attribute both social and personal 
failures to the systemic property (Harvey, 2005). The peak corresponding to the 
widening perception of “self-employed” brings out continuous feeling of failure 
during all segments of an individual worker’s career and the problematic of anxiety 
                                                          
10 It is 55.1%. 
11 It is 23% of GDP for United Kingdom, 26.7% for Germany and 30% for France. 
 44 
 
(Sennett, 2007). In this sense, the economic precarity of native workers tends to lead 
towards antagonism against more challengeable competitors: immigrants. In 
addition to the lack of labor solidarity and the downsizing of class-consciousness 
among workers coming from insecuritization, this mechanism is making the misery 
of immigrants double layered. 
The main finding of this research is that the cost of neoliberal insecurity for immigrant 
workers has increased in untold ways. As in Figure 4, they suffer more both due to 
their marginal position in the labor-market (especially in the case of women, and 
young workers) and due to the indirect cost of flexibility in the attitudes of native 
workers. Scholars agree that the first arrow-cost (1) is greater than the second one 
(2), which implies that the direct price of flexibility is bigger for immigrants 
(Landsbergis, Grzywacz & LaMontagne, 2014). However, while each worker is 
increasingly exposed to economic precarity, migrants also pay the social price of 
economic precarity of native labor. The third/indirect effect (3) of non-standard 
employment relations is almost invisible in the previous literature. Since this indirect 
effect of flexibility transforms economic precarity into aggression, unfriendliness, 
hostility, and anti-immigration, it might be called social precarity. The dual cost for 
immigrants comes into being by the combination of the first and the third arrows in 
Figure 4. 
Figure 4: The Dual Cost 
Neoliberal flexibility 
1                     2 
Immigrants             3           Natives 
 1: Direct cost of flexibility over immigrant workers. 
 2: Cost of flexibility over native workers. 
 3: Indirect cost of flexibility over immigrant workers, AIA 
Standing (2011, p.103) emphasized a similar framework, attributing precarity as the 
decisive characteristic of today’s precarious workers: “Capital welcomes migration 
because it brings low-cost malleable labour. The groups most vehemently opposed 
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to migration are the old (white) working class and lower middle class, squeezed by 
globalisation and falling into the precariat.” On the other hand, although his thesis so 
functional to attract notice for precarious work, results could not legitimize the 
“precariat” in terms of class making incapacity. If it is not yet class for itself, but class 
in the making, one might hope its upsurge is not as far as it seems. Marx once 
described class through the major tensions in capitalism, which is obliged to utilize 
labor in order to sustain itself. This was the “power” of labor in the production 
process, which also makes it a class (Wright, 2005). Contrarily, Standing comes up 
with his definition for precarity deriving from conjectural weakness of workers. That 
is why it seems quite complicated to scholars. Nevertheless, ineffectiveness of unions 
in contributing solidarity makes the precariat thesis of Standing significant, 
considering the fact that the nature of labor solidarity exceeds workplace. That is also 
why one should take solidarity in a broad sense including immigrants while insecurity 
of work has expanded onto every corner of social sphere. 
In addition, the findings of my study validate a phenomenon already known by most 
labor scholars. The age of insecurity and rising precarity has weaken class-
consciousness. Regarding the deeply engraved troubles of workers in today’s work 
life, by proving Sennett right, results contribute an empirical depth for his arguments. 
Through interrelated specific discussions in separate literatures, this study also 
contributes a theoretical depth to Sennett’s and his colleagues’ reading of post-
modern societies within surrounding insecurity. 
As I presented in the second chapter, AIA literature has a multi-part structure. This 
stems from the complicated structure of anti-immigration itself, which has taken over 
each corner of the social sphere. Therefore, scholars need to deal with dynamic 
theoretical implications and intersectional perspectives. Empirical progress in the last 
two decades has been very eyeful, but one cannot observe that much theoretical 
renewal in the literature. Scholars studying anti-immigration have been suggesting 
similar arguments to those of their predecessors, just with new statistical methods.  
Even though my empirical results legitimate some interests of the AIA literature on 
economic determinants (with the general effectiveness of the SJI and occupational-
status variables in the three countries), the theoretical discovery in this paper reveals 
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that “competition” as an explanation is insufficient to formulate the factual misery 
and position of immigrants in this framework. 
On the other basis, while education has been estimated as one of the main predictors 
of AIA in the previous literature, my findings show that its significance has been 
overstated. The effect of education seems to be explained with the contribution of 
occupational status, which is powerfully related to the work-life of an individual 
worker (Table 6). Moreover, a lack of interpersonal trust is another factor that has 
frequently cited as a cause of AIA, especially in early studies. It is easy to form a 
mental/philosophical bridge from lack of trust to the “negativeness” of an attitude in 
many cases. In societies where workers feel less pressure from the labor-market, 
levels of interpersonal trust might be higher. One may evaluate French society as the 
closest one to that among the three examined here. Nevertheless, under the 
supremacy of precarity and the political preferences of people, the potential of trust 
is largely reduced. From another perspective, even rising mistrust, where it exists, 
might spring from working life variables and, therefore, be discussed in connection 
to labor precarity. In this sense, the social consequences of labor-market flexibility 
bring out the unescapable tensions into the relationship of the capital and the labor 
therefore, this matter requires more interdisciplinary approaches.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that anti-immigrant attitudes among native workers in 
Europe are strongly associated with the individual effect of flexible employment. In 
other words, I propose that such negative attitudes are best understood as the 
reflection of the unmaking of workers’ class-consciousness under the umbrella of 
insecurity. The precarity is transforming immigrants into easy scapegoats in the eyes 
of natives, who are also precariously moving away from secure and continuous jobs. 
The theoretical literatures on which my thesis has drawn, include the explanations of 
anti-immigrant attitudes, the consequences of job insecurity, and increasing labor 
precarity. Furthermore, in order to specify in-depth discussions this thesis has utilized 
literature on post-modern insecurity in work life and the class-making capacity of 
precarity.  
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Through a three-layered OLS regression, I empirically analyzed the relationship 
between AIA and the SJI of individual native workers in Germany, the United Kingdom 
and France by applying a proper operationalization of the fourth and last wave of the 
European Value Survey (2008). SJI increases AIA in the three countries at varying 
levels with respect to contextual characteristics of these countries. The results of this 
validated my major theoretical argument, which accepts the charge of labor-market 
flexibility over immigrants as a dual cost with one more untold (indirect) effect of 
flexibility in the form of hostility from the native working classes. Additionally, in 
order to understand how these varied by country I analyzed the varying nature of 
nationhood and political cultures in, and the different labor-market policies of the 
three countries. 
French Republicanism, historical progress of strong left wing in France and its 
political-based nationhood helped to figure out French type AIA, for which the effect 
of the political view of workers is found as greater than SJI. The overall contribution 
of the attitude variables over the job variables (while checking R-square changes) is 
the biggest for the French AIA, which also has the smallest mean among the three 
countries. Furthermore, the model works better in the United Kingdom than other 
two countries with the great coefficient of SJI and the R-Square level in the final 
model. It also has the biggest mean of AIA. What might be the reason behind these 
results is, the United Kingdom has experienced the most salient deregulation since 
1980s, and nowadays has the most flexible labor-market with the lowest labor-
market expenditure ratio among the three countries. When it comes to Germany, it 
displays a moderate position. The insignificance of the concern about Europeans 
variable needs more attention but this study puts a question mark for this 
complication.  
By selecting three heading countries in Europe, which harbors immigrants the most, 
and by applying separate models in each country, which enables an opportunity for 
comparison, I carried out individual level analyses without disregarding contextual 
differentiations. My theoretical contribution and empirical findings indicate, on the 
one hand, that researchers studying AIA should keep in mind the adventure of labor 
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in the last few decades which has become highly insecure and structurally downsized. 
On the other hand, it is a good idea for labor researchers to be open to benefiting 
from and contributing to related fields of study, both empirical and theoretical. 
Intersectional perspectives always help shed light on the condition of the most 
vulnerable people in society. Bridging different literatures is very eye-opening and 
useful in this sense. 
There are some limitations within this study. First, like most previous research, it 
focused only on actively working individuals because of methodological constraints. 
Because employed and unemployed workers are both suffering from a crisis of job 
insecurity, one might think of SJI as something beyond the perceived threat of the 
loss of an active job. Researchers should consider that unemployed workers are in 
the specific process of the highest level of insecurity and deserve to be encompassed 
as a crucial component of labor insecurity discussions, since the limits between 
unemployed and employed workers are disappearing in terms of the overall 
precarization of labor force.  Second, regional or country-level variables are lacking 
in this study due to the structure of the data. With the contribution of the form of SJI 
variable in the questionnaire, I tried to cover upper levels by selecting different 
countries, and applying separate regressions for each. Yet a multilevel analysis is 
needed. Third, the topic requires more recent versions of datum. Fourth, I could not 
include further variables for labor solidarity because of data limitation. Findings are 
insufficient to broaden, since the only proxy belongs to a trade union. 
In terms of precarity discussions, despite of some deficiencies, it is encouraging to 
see remarkable efforts in the literature on global labor movement perspectives (Chun 
& Agarwala, 2016). Labor solidarity among immigrants and natives can be realized or 
sustained by appreciating what precarious work is, what it provides, and what it costs. 
My contribution is in last three of these points. For workers suffering from precarity 
to be able to imagine themselves as a “class” once again, passing “from denial to 
resistance” through “inclusive solidarity” appears as the only way (Neilson, 2015).  
Without delivering the dark but real picture of working classes, it is very difficult to 
handle contemporary troubles of capitalism. 
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Appendix 
Reliability Statistics: 
 
Table 6: Cronbach Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
,832 12 
It is given for all the database. 
 
France 
Table 7: ANOVA for France 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 32.343 9 3.594 8.641 ,000b 
Residual 261.590 629 0.416     
Total 293.933 638       
2 Regression 107.795 13 8.292 27.842 ,000c 
Residual 186.138 625 0.298     
Total 293.933 638       
3 Regression 131.210 18 7.289 27.774 ,000d 
Residual 162.723 620 0.262     
Total 293.933 638       
 
Figure 5: Histogram for Standardized Residuals for France 
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Figure 6: P-P Plot for Standardized Residuals for France 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Scatterplot for Standardized Residuals for France 
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The United Kingdom 
Table 8: ANOVA for the United Kingdom 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 22.168 9 2.463 6.936 ,000b 
Residual 75.992 214 0.355     
Total 98.160 223       
2 Regression 40.178 13 3.091 11.194 ,000c 
Residual 57.983 210 0.276     
Total 98.160 223       
3 Regression 56.206 18 3.123 15.258 ,000d 
Residual 41.954 205 0.205     
Total 98.160 223       
 
Figure 8: Histogram for Standardized Residuals for the United Kingdom 
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Figure 9: P-P Plot for Standardized Residuals for the United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Scatterplot for Standardized Residuals for the United Kingdom 
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Germany 
Table 9: ANOVA for Germany 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 14.792 9 1.644 5.667 ,000b 
Residual 166.182 573 0.290     
Total 180.974 582       
2 Regression 38.249 13 2.942 11.730 ,000c 
Residual 142.725 569 0.251     
Total 180.974 582       
3 Regression 56.032 18 3.113 14.052 ,000d 
Residual 124.942 564 0.222     
Total 180.974 582       
 
Figure 11: Histogram for Standardized Residuals for Germany 
 
 
 
 62 
 
Figure 12: P-P Plot for Standardized Residuals for Germany 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Scatterplot for Standardized Residuals for Germany 
